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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">finance</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Финансы: теория и практика/Finance: Theory and Practice</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Finance: Theory and Practice</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2587-5671</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2587-7089</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Financial University under The Government of Russian Federation</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.26794/2587-5671-2022-26-1-91-102</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">finance-1503</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ФОНДОВЫЙ РЫНОК</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>STOCK MARKET</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Инсайдерская торговля и модели информированной торговли</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Insider trading and informed trading patterns</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8029-5627</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Пё</surname><given-names>Г.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Pyo</surname><given-names>G.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Гюнгмин Пё — доктор философии, доцент кафедры налогообложения</p><p>Нонсан, Южный Чхунчхон</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Gyungmin Pyo — Ph. D. Asst. Prof., Department of Taxation</p><p>Chungnam</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">gmpyo1@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru">Университет Коньянг<country>Южная Корея</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en">Konyang University<country>Korea, Republic of</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2022</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>26</day><month>02</month><year>2022</year></pub-date><volume>26</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>91</fpage><lpage>102</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Пё Г., 2022</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2022</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Пё Г.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Pyo G.</copyright-holder><license license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://financetp.fa.ru/jour/article/view/1503">https://financetp.fa.ru/jour/article/view/1503</self-uri><abstract><p>Целью данной работы является изучение влияния инсайдерской торговли на торговые модели иностранных и институциональных инвесторов, особенно в компаниях с высокими дискреционными начислениями и низким коэффициентом «книга к рынку» в качестве показателей информационной неопределенности. В данном исследовании используются такие методы, как модели торговли информированных трейдеров, которые, как считается, собирают более точную информацию до и после инсайдерской торговли, и проверяется, как инсайдерская торговля влияет на информированных трейдеров. Результаты данного исследования свидетельствуют о том, что инсайдерская торговля, вероятно, влияет на торговые модели информированных трейдеров. После контроля факторов, специфичных для конкретной фирмы, данное исследование обнаружило, что событие и объем инсайдерской торговли существенно влияют на модели торговли иностранных и институциональных трейдеров. Более того, связь между информированной и инсайдерской торговлей усиливается, когда фирмы имеют высокий уровень дискреционных начислений и низкий коэффициент «книга к рынку». Предыдущие исследования были сосредоточены на связи между аномальной доходностью инсайдерской торговли и видами распространенной информации от инсайдеров, в то время как модели информированной торговли и инсайдерской торговли в условиях информационной неопределенности специально не рассматривались. Данное исследование позволяет практикам интерпретировать корпоративную инсайдерскую торговлю с информационной неопределенностью на модели информированной торговли.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>This paper aims to examine how corporate insider trading influences trading patterns of foreign and institutional investors especially in firms with high discretionary accruals and low book-to-market ratios as proxies for information uncertainty. This study uses methods such as trading patterns of informed traders who are considered to gather more precise information before and after insider trading and tests how insider trading affects informed traders. The results of this study provide evidence that insider trading is likely to influence informed traders’ trading patterns. After controlling for firm-specific factors, this study finds that the event and the amount of insider trading affect significantly foreign and institutional trading patterns. Furthermore, the relation between informed trading and insider trading is more enhanced when firms have a high level of discretionary accruals and a low book-to-market ratio. Prior studies have focused on the association between abnormal returns of insider trading and types of insider information disseminated, while informed trading patterns and insider trading with information uncertainty have not been specifically considered. This study enables practitioners to interpret corporate insider trading with information uncertainty on informed trading patterns.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>дискреционные начисления</kwd><kwd>информированная торговля</kwd><kwd>инсайдерская торговля</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>discretionary accruals</kwd><kwd>informed trading</kwd><kwd>insider trading</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Leland H. E. Insider trading: should it be prohibited? Journal of Political Economy. 1992;100(4):859–887.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Leland H. E. Insider trading: should it be prohibited? Journal of Political Economy. 1992;100(4):859–887.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit2"><label>2</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Seyhun H.N. 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