financeФинансы: теория и практика/Finance: Theory and PracticeFinance: Theory and Practice2587-56712587-7089Financial University under The Government of Russian Federation10.26794/2587-5671-2022-26-5-173-185finance-1813Research ArticleКОРПОРАТИВНЫЕ ФИНАНСЫCORPORATE FINANCEКакие акционеры заинтересованы в ESG-показателях компании?Which shareholders are interested in the ESG-indicators of the company?https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8630-3621Каргинова-ГубиноваВ. В.Karginova-GubinovaV. V.

Валентина Владимировна Каргинова-Губинова —  кандидат экономических наук, научный сотрудник отдела региональной экономической политики

Петрозаводск

Valentina V. Karginova-Gubinova —  Cand. Sci. (Econ.), Researcher in the Department of Regional Economic Policy

Petrozavodsk

vkarginowa@yandex.ruИнститут экономики — обособленное подразделение Карельского научного центра Российской академии наукРоссияInstitute of Economics of the Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of SciencesRussian Federation202208112022265173185Copyright © Каргинова-Губинова В.В., 20222022Каргинова-Губинова В.В.Karginova-Gubinova V.V.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://financetp.fa.ru/jour/article/view/1813

На сегодняшний день наблюдается низкий уровень соответствия российских компаний принципам устойчивой экономики, что во многом может определяться слабым интересом части корпоративных стейкхолдеров к показателям ESG (environmental, social and governance). Это обуславливает актуальность изучения отдельных групп стейкхолдеров и установление меры их заинтересованности в ESG-стратегии.

Целью данной работы является определение, какие акционеры имеют наибольший интерес к ESG-показателям компаний, чьи ценные бумаги обращаются на российском фондовом рынке. Исследование основано на данных на конец 2021 г. интернет–портала Yahoo Finance и компании Sustainalytics Inc.

Проведены кластерный, дисперсионный, регрессионный и корреляционный анализы, использованы методы дескриптивной статистики.

Результаты работы показали наличие особенностей структуры собственности российских компаний по сравнению с компаниями развитых стран. Подтверждено отсутствие интереса к корпоративным ESG-характеристикам со стороны инсайдеров. При этом рост доли институциональных акционеров приводит к снижению оцениваемого риска ESG, однако его темпы меньше, чем изменение доли акций у институциональных собственников. Отмечена различная важность отдельных компонент оценки ESG для институциональных акционеров.

Новизной исследования стало изучение ранее не исследованных российских инвесторов и эмитентов, а также установление комплексного влияния инсайдеров/аутсайдеров и институциональных/частных инвесторов. Научная значимость определяется выработкой нового подхода к изучению влияния степени ответственности инвесторов на корпоративные характеристики. Практическая значимость результатов заключается в получении возможности выработки адресных инструментов стимулирования акционеров компании для повышения их интереса к корпоративным ESG-показателям, увеличения устойчивости компаний и территорий. Работа будет интересна инвесторам, управляющим компаний, органам власти, некоммерческим организациям и специалистам в области ESG-инвестирования.

Today Russian companies have a low level of compliance with the principles of sustainable economy, which can be largely determined by a weak interest of some corporate stakeholders to ESG (environmental, social and governance) indicators. It determines the relevance of studying the individual groups of stakeholders and determine the measure of their interest in ESG-strategy.

The purpose of this work is to determine which shareholders are most interested in ESG indicators of companies whose securities are traded on the Russian stock market. The research is based on the data from Yahoo Finance and the website of the Sustainalytics, Inc. company as of the end of 2021.

Cluster, variance, regression and correlation analyses were carried out and methods of descriptive statistics were used.

Results of this work have revealed the presence of the features of ownership structure of Russian companies in comparison with companies of developed countries. The lack of insiders’ interest in corporate ESG characteristics has been confirmed. At the same time, the increase in the share of institutional shareholders leads to decrease in the assessed risk of ESG but its rate is less than the change in the shares of institutional owners. The different importance of individual components of the ESG assessment for institutional shareholders has been noted.

The novelty of this research is the study of Russian investors and issuers that have not been systematically studied before as well as the ascertainment of complex influence of insiders/outsiders and institutional/private investors. The scientific significance is determined by the development of a new approach to study the influence of the degree of investor responsibility on corporate characteristics. The practical significance of the results lies in obtaining the possibility of developing targeted incentive tools for company shareholders to increase their interest in corporate ESG-indicators and to increase the sustainability of the company and territories. This research will be of interest to investors, company managers, authorities, non-profit organizations and specialists in the field of ESG investment.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.