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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">finance</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Финансы: теория и практика/Finance: Theory and Practice</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Finance: Theory and Practice</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2587-5671</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2587-7089</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Financial University under The Government of Russian Federation</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.26794/2587-5671-2023-27-1-91-102</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">finance-1990</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>НОВЫЕ БАНКОВСКИЕ ТЕХНОЛОГИИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>NEW BANKING TECHNOLOGIES</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Достижение равновесия кредитного рационирования в условиях цифровизации</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Credit Rationing Equilibrium Achievement in the Conditions of Digitalization</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9179-1180</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Луняков</surname><given-names>О. В.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Lunyakov</surname><given-names>O. V.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Олег Владимирович Луняков - доктор экономических наук, профессор департамента банковского дела и монетарного регулирования</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Oleg V. Lunyakov - Dr. Sci. (Econ.), Prof., Department of Banking and Monetary Regulation</p><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">ovlunyakov@fa.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru">Финансовый университет<country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en">Financial University<country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2023</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>10</day><month>03</month><year>2023</year></pub-date><volume>27</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>91</fpage><lpage>102</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Луняков О.В., 2023</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2023</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Луняков О.В.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Lunyakov O.V.</copyright-holder><license license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://financetp.fa.ru/jour/article/view/1990">https://financetp.fa.ru/jour/article/view/1990</self-uri><abstract><p>Автором проведено уточнение степени достижения равновесия на кредитном рынке в условиях асимметрии информации и активной цифровизации процессов в деятельности участников кредитного рынка. Предмет исследования - экономические и технологические условия для достижения равновесия кредитного рационирования. Цель работы состоит в выделении характера влияния цифровизации на степень достижения равновесия на кредитном рынке в условиях цифровизации. Автором акцентируется внимание на новых условиях функционирования кредитного рынка, когда текущая цифровизация позволяет существенно дополнить кредитный профиль заемщиков, а на кредитном рынке появляются новые участники. Задачей исследования является оценка соответствия теоретических положений о достижении равновесия кредитного рационирования в условиях цифровизации процессов, связанных с предоставлением кредита. Выдвигается гипотеза о том, что на кредитном рынке имеется потенциал в повышении совокупной величины выплат на одну денежную единицу ссуженных средств, а формирующиеся оценки вероятности дефолтов заемщиков, ставок процента являются «смещенными». Автор использовал системный и логический методы, которые позволили рассмотреть равновесие на кредитном рынке с точки зрения совокупности экономических взаимосвязей его участников и достигаемых экономических показателей. В результате анализа теоретических положений о равновесии кредитного рационирования с учетом выделенных качественных изменений, которые происходят на кредитном рынке в условиях цифровизации, сделан вывод о потенциально возможном приращении в доходности кредитных операций. Дополнение кредитных данных о заемщиках альтернативными, некредитными источниками, как предполагается, позволит более точно оценивать их кредитоспособность. Результаты исследования в определенной мере служат обоснованием возможных решений центральных банков по расширению традиционных источников кредитных историй заемщиков, реконфигурации существующей архитектуры обмена информацией на кредитном рынке.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The author clarified the degree of achievement of the credit market equilibrium in the conditions of information asymmetry and active digitalization of processes in activity of credit market participants. The subject of research is the economic and technological conditions for achieving credit rationing equilibrium. The purpose of the research is to highlight the nature of the impact of digitalization on the degree of achieving equilibrium in the credit market in the context of digitalization. The author focuses on the new conditions of functioning of the credit market, when the current digitalization allows to significantly complement the credit profile of borrowers, and new participants appear in the credit market. The objective of research is assessment of compliance of theoretical postulates on achieving the credit rationing equilibrium in the context of digitalization of processes associated with the lending. The authors’ hypothesis is that the credit market has the potential to increase the return on a loan per currency unit of borrowers’ loans, and the current estimates of the of defaults borrowers’ probability, interest rates are “biased”. As the main methods, the author used systematic and logical methods, which made it possible to consider the credit market equilibrium in terms of the economic relationships between its participants and the achieved economic indicators. As a result of the analysis of theoretical concept of credit rationing equilibrium, taking into account the identified qualitative changes, that take place in the credit market in the context of digitalization. The author concludes that is the potential increase the rate of return on credit operations. Extending the borrower credit data with alternative, non-credit sources, as expected, allows to get more accurate creditworthiness assessment. The results of the research to some extent serve as a rationale for possible decisions of central banks to expand the traditional sources of borrowers’ credit histories, reconfigure the existing information exchange architecture in the credit market.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>асимметрия информации</kwd><kwd>кредитный рынок</kwd><kwd>цифровизация экономики</kwd><kwd>равновесие кредитного рационирования</kwd><kwd>спрос и предложения кредита</kwd><kwd>моральный риск</kwd><kwd>риск неблагоприятного отбора</kwd><kwd>бюро кредитных историй</kwd><kwd>обогащенные данные</kwd><kwd>кредитные истории</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>information asymmetry</kwd><kwd>credit market</kwd><kwd>digitalization of the economy</kwd><kwd>credit rationing equilibrium</kwd><kwd>credit supply and demand</kwd><kwd>moral hazard</kwd><kwd>adverse selection risk</kwd><kwd>credit history bureaus (CHBs)</kwd><kwd>enriched data</kwd><kwd>credit histories</kwd></kwd-group><funding-group xml:lang="ru"><funding-statement>Статья подготовлена по результатам исследований на тему «Современная теория финансового развития», выполненных за счет бюджетных средств по государственному заданию на 2022 г. Финансовый университет, Москва, Россия.</funding-statement></funding-group><funding-group xml:lang="en"><funding-statement>The presented article is a result of research on the theme “Modern Theory of Financial Development”. It was funded by the budgetary funds to fulfill the state task to the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation for 2022.</funding-statement></funding-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Scott I. O. The availability doctrine: theoretical underpinnings. Review of Economic Studies. 1957;25:41–48.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Scott I. O. The availability doctrine: theoretical underpinnings. Review of Economic Studies. 1957;25:41–48.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit2"><label>2</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Hodgman D. R. Credit risk and credit rationing. 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