Credit Rationing Equilibrium Achievement in the Conditions of Digitalization

The author clarified the degree of achievement of the credit market equilibrium in the conditions of information asymmetry and active digitalization of processes in activity of credit market participants. The subject of research is the economic and technological conditions for achieving credit rationing equilibrium. The purpose of the research is to highlight the nature of the impact of digitalization on the degree of achieving equilibrium in the credit market in the context of digitalization. The author focuses on the new conditions of functioning of the credit market, when the current digitalization allows to significantly complement the credit profile of borrowers, and new participants appear in the credit market. The objective of research is assessment of compliance of theoretical postulates on achieving the credit rationing equilibrium in the context of digitalization of processes associated with the lending. The authors’ hypothesis is that the credit market has the potential to increase the return on a loan per currency unit of borrowers’ loans, and the current estimates of the of defaults borrowers’ probability, interest rates are “biased”. As the main methods, the author used systematic and logical methods, which made it possible to consider the credit market equilibrium in terms of the economic relationships between its participants and the achieved economic indicators. As a result of the analysis of theoretical concept of credit rationing equilibrium, taking into account the identified qualitative changes, that take place in the credit market in the context of digitalization. The author concludes that is the potential increase the rate of return on credit operations. Extending the borrower credit data with alternative, non-credit sources, as expected, allows to get more accurate creditworthiness assessment. The results of the research to some extent serve as a rationale for possible decisions of central banks to expand the traditional sources of borrowers’ credit histories, reconfigure the existing information exchange architecture in the credit market.

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