Reserve Capital buffer as an Instrument of Macroprudential Policy

The analysis of Basel III main provisions shows that within the macroprudential policy, increasing the financial stability of the banking sector is achieved by growing the capital of banks and creating new tools to solve short-term liquidity problems. The proposed measures seem well developed, except one fact — the quantitative values of the regulatory requirements for growing the bank capital are insufficient to achieve the macroprudential policy objectives. This study aims to develop analytical tools allowing to form quantitative objectives of the macroprudential policy and to deliver them by streamlining the capital requirements of banks. The methods of comparative and GAP analyses were used in the study. The empirical analysis was performed with the data on the Russian stock index IMOEX dynamics, the data from the reports by the Bank of Russia and financial reports of systemically important Russian banks. According to the study results, a quantitative strategic objective of the macroprudential policy in the Russian Federation was determined, a gradual increase in the capital adequacy ratio of Russian banks to 40% was proposed, a calendar plan was developed to achieve the strategic objective stagewise in 10 years, and banks are realistic in achieving this objective. As a regulatory instrument to grow the capital adequacy of banks according to the target level, it is proposed to use an additional regulatory capital requirement in the form of a reserve buffer of a dynamic and adaptive nature. The empirical analysis of the possibilities and consequences of a new regulatory instrument application proved the expediency of its introduction to improve the effectiveness of the macroprudential policy in the Russian Federation. 

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