Какие акционеры заинтересованы в ESG-показателях компании?

На сегодняшний день наблюдается низкий уровень соответствия российских компаний принципам устойчивой экономики, что во многом может определяться слабым интересом части корпоративных стейкхолдеров к показателям ESG (environmental, social and governance). Это обуславливает актуальность изучения отдельных групп стейкхолдеров и установление меры их заинтересованности в ESG-стратегии.

Целью данной работы является определение, какие акционеры имеют наибольший интерес к ESG-показателям компаний, чьи ценные бумаги обращаются на российском фондовом рынке. Исследование основано на данных на конец 2021 г. интернет–портала Yahoo Finance и компании Sustainalytics Inc.

Проведены кластерный, дисперсионный, регрессионный и корреляционный анализы, использованы методы дескриптивной статистики.

Результаты работы показали наличие особенностей структуры собственности российских компаний по сравнению с компаниями развитых стран. Подтверждено отсутствие интереса к корпоративным ESG-характеристикам со стороны инсайдеров. При этом рост доли институциональных акционеров приводит к снижению оцениваемого риска ESG, однако его темпы меньше, чем изменение доли акций у институциональных собственников. Отмечена различная важность отдельных компонент оценки ESG для институциональных акционеров.

Новизной исследования стало изучение ранее не исследованных российских инвесторов и эмитентов, а также установление комплексного влияния инсайдеров/аутсайдеров и институциональных/частных инвесторов. Научная значимость определяется выработкой нового подхода к изучению влияния степени ответственности инвесторов на корпоративные характеристики. Практическая значимость результатов заключается в получении возможности выработки адресных инструментов стимулирования акционеров компании для повышения их интереса к корпоративным ESG-показателям, увеличения устойчивости компаний и территорий. Работа будет интересна инвесторам, управляющим компаний, органам власти, некоммерческим организациям и специалистам в области ESG-инвестирования.

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